In old presentations on network security (watch this space; I’m working on a new security course for Ignition in the next six months or so), I would use a pair of chocolate chip cookies as an illustration for network security. In the old days, I’d opine, network security was like a cookie that was baked to be crunchy on the outside and gooey on the inside. Now-a-days, however, I’d say network security needs to be more like a store-bought cookie—crunchy all the way through. I always used this illustration to make a point about defense-in-depth. You cannot assume the thin crunchy security layer at the edge of your network—generally in the form of stateful packet filters and the like (okay, firewalls, but let’s leave the appliance world behind for a moment)—is what you really need.

There are such things as insider attacks, after all. Further, once someone breaks through the thin crunchy layer at the edge, you really don’t want them being able to move laterally through your network.

The United States National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has released a draft paper describing Zero Trust Architecture, which addresses many of the same concerns as the cookie that’s crunchy all the way through—the lateral movement of attackers through your network, for instance.

The situation, however, has changed quite a bit since I used the cookie illustration. The problem is no longer that the inside of your network needs to be just as secure as the outside of your network, but rather that there is no “inside” to your network any longer. For this we need to add a third cookie—the kind you get in the soft-baked packages, or even in the jar (or roll) of cookie dough—these cookies are gooey all the way through.

To understand why this is… It used to be, way back when, we had a fairly standard Demilitarized Zone design.



For those unfamiliar with this design, D is configured to block traffic to C or A’s interfaces, and C is configured as a stateful filter and to block access to A’s addresses. If D is taken over, it should not have access to C or A; if C is taken over, it still should not have access to A. This provides a sort-of defense-in-depth.

Building this kind of DMZ, however, anticipates there will be at most a few ways into the network. These entries are choke points that give the network operator a place to look for anything “funny.”

Moving applications to the cloud, widespread remote work, and many other factors have rendered the “choke point/DMZ” model of security. There just isn’t a hard edge any longer to harden; just because someone is “inside” the topological bounds of your network does not mean they are authorized to be there, or to access data and applications.

The new solution is Zero Trust—moving authentication out to the endpoints. The crux of Zero Trust is to prevent unauthorized access to data or services on a per user, per device basis. There is still an “implied trust zone,” a topology within a sort of DMZ, where user traffic is trusted—but these are small areas with no user-controlled hosts.

If you want to understand Zero Trust beyond just the oft thrown around “microsegmentation,” this paper is well worth reading, as it explains the terminology and concepts in terms even network engineers can understand.