When rolling out a new protocol such as IPv6, it is useful to consider the changes to security posture, particularly the network’s attack surface. While protocol security discussions are widely available, there is often not “one place” where you can go to get information about potential attacks, references to research about those attacks, potential counters, and operational challenges. In the case of IPv6, however, there is “one place” you can find all this information: draft-ietf-opsec-v6. This document is designed to provide information to operators about IPv6 security based on solid operational experience—and it is a must read if you have either deployed IPv6 or are thinking about deploying IPv6.
The draft is broken up into four broad sections; the first is the longest, addressing generic security considerations. The first consideration is whether operators should use Provider Independent (PI) or Provider Assigned (PA) address space. One of the dangers with a large address space is the sheer size of the potential routing table in the Default Free Zone (DFZ). If every network operator opted for an IPv6 /32, the potential size of the DFZ routing table is 2.4 billion routing entries. If you thought converging on about 800,000 routes is bad, just wait ‘til there are 2.4 billion routes. Of course, the actual PI space is being handed out on /48 boundaries, which makes the potential table size exponentially larger. PI space, then, is “bad for the Internet” in some very important ways.
This document provides the other side of the argument—security is an issue with PA space. While IPv6 was supposed to make renumbering as “easy as flipping a switch,” it does not, in fact, come anywhere near this. Some reports indicate IPv6 re-addressing is more difficult than IPv4. Long, difficult renumbering processes indicate many opportunities for failures in security, and hence a large attack surface. Preferring PI space over PA space becomes a matter of reducing the operational attack surface.
Another interesting question when managing an IPv6 network is whether static addressing should be used for some services, or if all addresses should be dynamically learned. There is a perception out there that because the IPv6 address space is so large, it cannot be “scanned” to find hosts to attack. As pointed out in this draft, there is research showing this is simply not true. Further, static addresses may expose specific servers or services to easy recognition by an attacker. The point the authors make here is that either way, endpoint security needs to rely on actual security mechanisms, rather than on hiding addresses in some way.
Other very useful topics considered here are Unique Local Addresses (ULAs), numbering and managing point-to-point links, privacy extensions for SLAAC, using a /64 per host, extension headers, securing DHCP, ND/RA filtering, and control plane security.
If you are deploying, or thinking about deploying, IPv6 in your network, this is a “must read” document.