The Hedge Pdocast Episode 43: Ivan Pepelnjak and Trusting Routing Protocols
Can you really trust what a routing protocol tells you about how to reach a given destination? Ivan Pepelnjak joins Nick Russo and Russ White to provide a longer version of the tempting one-word answer: no! Join us as we discuss a wide range of issues including third-party next-hops, BGP communities, and the RPKI.
History of USENET with Steve Bellovin
Steve Bellovin began working on networks as a system administrator, helping to build USENIX, which supports operating system research. His work as a system administrator drew his interest into security and cryptographic protection of data, leading him into working on some of the foundational protocols on the Internet.
Weekend Reads 070320
While the pandemic circling the globe has undermined many critical systems and institutions of our society, I believe it also has the potential to strengthen the resolve of the Internet community to embrace the vision Berners-Lee had more than 50 years ago. We have the opportunity to enter the next major phase of the Internet — the era of trust. —Byron Holland
MANRS began as a collaboration among network operators and internet exchange providers, with Verisign formally becoming a participant in its Network Operator Program in 2017. Since then, with the help of Verisign and other MANRS participants, the initiative has grown to also include content delivery networks (CDN) and cloud providers. —Yong Kim
Packet Pushers: The New Network Challenge
A couple of weeks ago Scott Morris, Ethan Banks, and I sat down to talk about a project I’ve been working on for a while—a different way of looking at reaching for and showing your skills as a network engineer.
The Hedge Podcast Episode 42: Andrei Robachevsky and MANRS
The security of the global routing table is foundational to the security of the overall Internet as an ecosystem—if routing cannot be trusted, then everything that relies on routing is suspect, as well. Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security (MANRS) is a project of the Internet Society designed to draw network operators of all kinds into thinking about, and doing something about, the security of the global routing table by using common-sense filtering and observation. Andrei Robachevsky joins Russ White and Tom Ammon to talk about MANRS.
The Network is not Free: The Case of the Connected Toaster
Latency is a big deal for many modern applications, particularly in the realm of machine learning applied to problems like determining if someone standing at your door is a delivery person or a … robber out to grab all your smart toasters and big screen television. The problem is networks, particularly in the last mile don’t deal with latency very well. In fact, most of the network speeds and feeds available in anything outside urban areas kindof stinks.
Weekend Reads 062620
High impact vulnerabilities in modern communication protocol used by mobile network operators (MNOs) can be exploited to intercept user data and carry out impersonation, fraud, and denial of service (DoS) attacks, cautions a newly published research. —Ravie Lakshmanan
The Hedge Episode 41: Centralized Architectures with Jari Arkko
Consolidation is a well-recognized trend in the Internet ecosystem—but what does this centralization mean in terms of distributed systems, such as the DNS? Jari Arkko joins this episode of the Hedge, along with Alvaro Retana, to discuss the import and impact of centralization on the Internet through his draft, draft-arkko-arch-infrastructure-centralisation.
The History of LINUX and SUSE with Dirk Hohndel
Started as a consulting company, SUSA was one of the first organizations to begin working in the development and commercialization of LINUX. Through the years, LINUX has become the base for much of the IT world, including many of the open source network operating systems. Dirk Hohndel joins the History of Networking to discuss the origins of SUSA LINUX.
Research: Off-Path TCP Attacks
I’s fnny, bt yu cn prbbly rd ths evn thgh evry wrd s mssng t lst ne lttr. This is because every effective language—or rather every communication system—carried enough information to reconstruct the original meaning even when bits are dropped. Over-the-wire protocols, like TCP, are no different—the protocol must carry enough information about the conversation (flow data) and the data being carried (metadata) to understand when something is wrong and error out or ask for a retransmission. These things, however, are a form of data exhaust; much like you can infer the tone, direction, and sometimes even the content of conversation just by watching the expressions, actions, and occasional word spoken by one of the participants, you can sometimes infer a lot about a conversation between two applications by looking at the amount and timing of data crossing the wire.