When rolling out a new protocol such as IPv6, it is useful to consider the changes to security posture, particularly the network’s attack surface. While protocol security discussions are widely available, there is often not “one place” where you can go to get information about potential attacks, references to research about those attacks, potential counters, and operational challenges. In the case of IPv6, however, there is “one place” you can find all this information: draft-ietf-opsec-v6. This document is designed to provide information to operators about IPv6 security based on solid operational experience—and it is a must read if you have either deployed IPv6 or are thinking about deploying IPv6.
The draft is broken up into four broad sections; the first is the longest, addressing generic security considerations. The first consideration is whether operators should use Provider Independent (PI) or Provider Assigned (PA) address space. One of the dangers with a large address space is the sheer size of the potential routing table in the Default Free Zone (DFZ). If every network operator opted for an IPv6 /32, the potential size of the DFZ routing table is 2.4 billion routing entries. If you thought converging on about 800,000 routes is bad, just wait ‘til there are 2.4 billion routes. Of course, the actual PI space is being handed out on /48 boundaries, which makes the potential table size exponentially larger. PI space, then, is “bad for the Internet” in some very important ways.
This document provides the other side of the argument—security is an issue with PA space. While IPv6 was supposed to make renumbering as “easy as flipping a switch,” it does not, in fact, come anywhere near this. Some reports indicate IPv6 re-addressing is more difficult than IPv4. Long, difficult renumbering processes indicate many opportunities for failures in security, and hence a large attack surface. Preferring PI space over PA space becomes a matter of reducing the operational attack surface.
Another interesting question when managing an IPv6 network is whether static addressing should be used for some services, or if all addresses should be dynamically learned. There is a perception out there that because the IPv6 address space is so large, it cannot be “scanned” to find hosts to attack. As pointed out in this draft, there is research showing this is simply not true. Further, static addresses may expose specific servers or services to easy recognition by an attacker. The point the authors make here is that either way, endpoint security needs to rely on actual security mechanisms, rather than on hiding addresses in some way.
Other very useful topics considered here are Unique Local Addresses (ULAs), numbering and managing point-to-point links, privacy extensions for SLAAC, using a /64 per host, extension headers, securing DHCP, ND/RA filtering, and control plane security.
If you are deploying, or thinking about deploying, IPv6 in your network, this is a “must read” document.
Windows and Linux users need to beware, as an all-in-one, destructive malware strain has been discovered in the wild that features multiple malware capabilities including ransomware, cryptocurrency miner, botnet, and self-propagating worm targeting Linux and Windows systems. —Swati Khandelwal @The Hacker News
According to IDC Research’s recent US DDoS Prevention Survey, more than 50% of IT security decision makers said that their organization had been the victim of a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack as many as 10 times in the past year. For those who experienced an attack, more than 40% lasted longer than 10 hours. This statistic correlates with our ATLAS findings, which show there were 7.5 million DDoS attacks in 2017 — a rate, says Cisco, that is increasing at roughly the same rate as Internet traffic. —Carlos Morales @Dark Reading
As the topic of hacking back continues to resurface among elected officials, those of us in the cybersecurity community are scratching our heads over why this concept refuses to die. After digging deeper, one can see that there are many misperceptions regarding what the terms “hacking back” and “active cyber defense” (ACD) actually mean. General frustration and misinformation are driving the interest, but the mixing of definitions is fueling confusion. —Carolyn Crandall @Dark Reading
Good cyber-hygiene practices remain foundational—the nature of the vulnerability is different, but the framework and approach to managing it are not. In a world of zero days and multidimensional vulnerabilities such as Spectre and Meltdown, the speed and effectiveness of the response to triage and prioritizing risk-reduction efforts are vital to all organizations. More high-profile and complex vulnerabilities are sure to follow, so now is a good time to take lessons learned from Spectre and Meltdown and use them to help prepare for the next battle. @ACM Queue
Though Zuckerberg’s infamous quote was delivered in 2007, ageism remains a big problem in tech today. A study by Visier Insights found that “Gen Xers in tech are being hired 33% less (and baby boomers 60% less) than their workforce representation, while millennials in tech are being hired almost a whopping 50% more than their workforce representation.” —Keely Palmer @MarketWatch
With a graph database, you don’t store data in tables and then skim along the rows and columns to extract answers, input data, or determine relations that drive online transactions, but rather the literal relationships between data are explicitly represented and not figured out interactively on the fly. A graph is a network of things, called nodes, with their relationships expressed as links, called edges. The nodes in a graph database can be tagged with properties, which are additional information that can be used to express more complex relationships and linkages. —Timothy Prickett Morgan @The Next Platform
There’s a lot of talk these days about “content moderation.” Policymakers, some public interest groups, and even some users are clamoring for intermediaries to do “more,” to make the Internet more “civil,” though there are wildly divergent views on what that “more” should be. Others vigorously oppose such moderation, arguing that encouraging the large platforms to assert and ever-greater role as Internet speech police will cause all kinds of collateral damage, particularly to already marginalized communities. —Corynne McSherry @EFF
One of the fallouts of disruptive inventions is the need for new laws to counter their unexpected consequences. As it concerned the Internet, these consequences included a new tort of registering domain names identical or confusingly similar to trademarks and service marks with the intention of taking unlawful advantage of rights owners. —Gerald M. Levine @CircleID